Tensions brewing over the South China Sea have evolved into one of the most persistent flashpoints of modern geopolitics. At the heart of this maritime chessboard are two rival visions of regional order, one defined by Beijing’s historical claims and growing assertiveness, and the other framed by Washington’s rebalancing strategy, which seeks to counterbalance China’s expanding footprint. Though their confrontation is not always direct, the underlying rivalry has shaped diplomatic calculations, military postures, and economic alliances throughout the Asia-Pacific. While maritime boundaries, fishing rights, and resource control appear to be the surface issues, they are but strands in a deeper contest for regional dominance, one whose implications stretch well beyond the shallow waters of the disputed sea.
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The South China Sea, often reduced to a cartographic dispute, is in fact a strategic artery. It facilitates nearly a third of global maritime trade and is believed to hold vast untapped reserves of oil and gas. Moreover, it is a vital zone for commercial fisheries and a theatre of power projection for regional and extra-regional actors alike. For China, dominance in this body of water reinforces its vision of restored national pride and strategic autonomy. For the United States, however, the sea represents not only a crucial commercial route but a symbol of international maritime order, one based on open access and established legal frameworks. These competing interests have intensified over the past two decades, especially as China has become increasingly emboldened in asserting its claims under the so-called nine-dash line.
To understand the present friction, one must consider the policy realignment Washington initiated during the Obama administration. In 2011, speaking before the Australian Parliament, then-President Obama outlined a shift in US strategic focus from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific. This "rebalancing," as it was termed, was a calculated pivot designed to secure American interests in a region witnessing China’s rapid rise. The South China Sea, already contentious by that time, naturally became a primary concern. The policy centered on three main pillars: reinforcing the military presence, strengthening alliances, and boosting the capabilities of regional partners. Each component was aimed at reinforcing Washington’s influence while keeping Beijing’s ambitions in check.
Enhancing the US military presence took several forms. Chief among them were Freedom of Navigation Operations, or FONOPs, which challenged what Washington viewed as unlawful maritime claims. According to the US Department of Defense, six such operations were carried out in 2017, five in 2018, and nine in 2019. These missions, often involving close encounters between US naval vessels and Chinese forces, sent a clear message that America would not concede the principle of open seas, regardless of Chinese protests. Alongside these maneuvers, joint exercises and increased deployments ensured that US presence remained visible and credible across contested waters.
However, hard power alone could not sustain American strategy. Washington’s second prong focused on deepening alliances, particularly with nations that share maritime borders or geopolitical stakes in the region. The Philippines, a treaty ally of the US, has become one of the most significant recipients of American diplomatic and military engagement. During a 2014 visit, President Obama assured Manila of America’s unwavering commitment, stating that allies would not be left to stand alone. More recently, arrangements such as AUKUS, linking Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—have underlined a broader attempt to stitch together a strategic network to deter unilateral actions in the region.
In addition to fostering alliances, Washington has also committed resources to build the capacity of regional actors. Legislation signed by President Biden allocated billions in military financing to Taiwan and other Indo-Pacific partners. The objective here is not merely to arm allies, but to elevate their ability to resist coercion and protect their maritime entitlements. As China continues to flex its muscle, Washington seeks to ensure that no regional actor becomes overly reliant on Beijing’s economic or political goodwill.
Nevertheless, if America’s approach is measured and externally focused, China’s is equally calculated, though more direct. Beijing’s claim over nearly 90 percent of the South China Sea is not new, but the assertiveness with which it now defends that claim is unprecedented. President Xi Jinping has framed control of the region as an issue of national sovereignty and historical justice. Accordingly, China has employed a variety of tactics to fortify its position, land reclamation, unilateral fishing bans, and maritime militia deployments, among others. Each action signals not just determination, but a refusal to accommodate alternative claims.
Land reclamation remains perhaps the most visible manifestation of China’s policy. According to US assessments, China has reclaimed over 3,000 acres of land in the region since 2013, turning reefs into full-fledged military outposts equipped with runways, radar systems, and missile platforms. These artificial islands, though built upon disputed features, are presented by China as defensive installations. However, for neighboring states and outside observers, they represent an alarming shift in the regional balance.
China’s assertiveness also extends to the economic sphere. Its imposition of unilateral fishing bans, ostensibly for sustainability, are seen by other claimants as attempts to legitimize control over contested waters. The 2024 ban, in place from May to September, is merely the latest in a series of moves that raise tensions with countries like Vietnam and the Philippines, both of whom reject China’s authority to impose such restrictions in areas falling within their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).
Perhaps most troubling is China’s reliance on maritime militia, a grey zone force of fishing vessels reportedly under the command of the People’s Liberation Army. These vessels, while not formally military, have been involved in confrontations with other claimants. In 2023, for instance, a Chinese coast guard ship and a maritime militia vessel collided with a Philippine coast guard ship, highlighting how incidents involving non-naval actors can easily escalate. The use of such tactics blurs lines between civilian and military roles, complicating international responses and elevating the risk of miscalculation.
As these strategies unfold, China’s disputes with individual countries continue to deepen. With the Philippines, the Scarborough Shoal remains a particularly sensitive flashpoint. In 2024, China’s coast guard fired water cannons at a Philippine supply boat, injuring sailors and escalating diplomatic tensions. President Marcos Jr. has taken a firmer stance than his predecessor, enhancing ties with the US and securing greater access for American forces. Meanwhile, Vietnam remains locked in its own struggle with China over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. The 2014 oil rig crisis, when China deployed drilling infrastructure within Vietnam’s EEZ, sparked weeks of maritime standoffs and protests. Hanoi has since accelerated its artificial island-building, in part to match China’s growing presence.
Taiwan, too, remains in the crosshairs. While self-governed, Taipei claims several features in the South China Sea that overlap with Beijing’s nine-dash line. Joint military exercises between the US and Taiwan, along with robust arms sales, have only fueled China’s anxieties. While the situation is comparatively less volatile than with the Philippines, it contributes to the broader pattern of contestation.
Faced with this tangled landscape, the question arises, can the dispute be resolved without conflict? The answer may lie in history. One useful precedent is the agreement between Germany and Luxembourg, which turned the Moselle River into a jointly administered condominium. Likewise, regional actors in the South China Sea could explore shared sovereignty arrangements, particularly for fisheries and maritime resources. Another promising example comes from the Barents Sea, where Russia and Norway, after decades of disagreement, signed a treaty in 2010 that established clear maritime boundaries and resource-sharing mechanisms. The agreement did not require either party to renounce core claims; rather, it fostered cooperation through compromise and law.
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Such models offer a way forward, one rooted in diplomacy rather than domination. Establishing a regional fisheries management body, akin to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, could also help. By coordinating conservation efforts and regulating catch quotas, such a body would not only preserve marine resources but reduce competition and prevent future skirmishes.
In the final analysis, the South China Sea remains a theatre of contest, but it need not remain a battleground. The rebalancing posture of the US and the assertive maneuvers of China are not inherently irreconcilable. However, as long as unilateral actions persist, and as long as regional disputes are viewed through the lens of great power rivalry, the chances for meaningful resolution remain slim. The path to peace, if it exists, will depend on collective will, among global powers and regional actors alike, to reframe the contest not as a zero-sum struggle, but as a shared responsibility. Only then can the waters that connect so many nations cease to divide them.
