The identity of a state is more than a slogan or a constitutional label. It is the defining framework that sets the ideological and institutional course for generations. In Pakistan's case, the failure to articulate a coherent national identity has bred confusion and discord, both internally and externally. This ambiguity, rooted in the unresolved tension between religious aspirations and secular governance, continues to haunt the country.

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At its inception, Pakistan was born out of a movement fueled by Muslim nationalism, with the two-nation theory serving as its ideological spine. However, while the movement leaned heavily on religious identity to justify separation from India, its leadership, particularly Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was hesitant to establish a theocratic state. He envisaged a democratic republic that respected religious freedom and pluralism, although inspired by Islamic ethics. This ambivalence at the very foundation sowed seeds of contradiction in the future political discourse. As Anatol Lieven notes in his work Pakistan, a Hard Country, Muslim numerical weakness meant that Jinnah and the League could not block Congress’s plans by democratic and constitutional means, so they were critically dependent on Muslim street power, and this street power was largely mobilized using the rhetoric of Islam and of communal fear.
After independence, the new state found itself struggling with multiple conflicting expectations. On one hand, segments of society expected Pakistan to evolve into a Sharia-based Islamic state. On the other hand, the secular elite and legal structure inherited from British colonialism tilted towards Western-style democracy. The Objective Resolution of 1949, which was passed under Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, attempted to reconcile these opposing visions by asserting that sovereignty belonged to Allah but that the exercise of power would be through elected representatives. It included references to Islamic principles of justice, equality, and morality but also reaffirmed democratic norms. The resolution satisfied both religious and modernist demands by incorporating Islamic values into law while also embedding democratic representation, thus establishing a dual commitment.
However, this compromise became the source of long-term confusion. It lacked specificity in determining how Islamic principles would be operationalized within a democratic framework. The inherited British laws remained largely intact, and attempts to draft a cohesive Islamic constitution floundered in debates about interpretation, sect, and implementation. The death of Jinnah in 1948 deprived the state of a unifying figure who might have navigated these waters more clearly. His successors lacked the political authority and intellectual clarity to resolve the ideological dilemma.
Following Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination in 1951, political leadership became fragmented, and the lack of unity deepened the ideological rift. Sectarian issues, such as the Ahmadi movement’s opposition in 1953, further demonstrated the complications of translating a general Islamic ethos into governance without alienating minorities or fomenting intra-Muslim divisions. The 1953 anti-Ahmadi riots exposed deep fractures within the Muslim majority and led to the first instance of martial law in Lahore, highlighting the danger of unchecked religious agitation in a state without a clear ideological compass.
From the 1950s onward, Pakistan swung between conflicting ideological poles. Ayub Khan's military regime leaned toward modernization and economic liberalism influenced by Western models. He introduced reforms in education, family law, and economic planning, steering the country closer to secular technocracy. Yet his reforms were viewed by conservative elements as an attempt to Westernize a state born in the name of Islam. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto later attempted to fuse socialism with Islamic principles, giving rise to what he termed "Islamic socialism." While his slogan resonated with the masses, it failed to construct a durable ideological framework. It remained more of a populist tool than a system of governance.
General Zia-ul-Haq reversed this course dramatically. His regime prioritized Islamization, including the introduction of Sharia courts, Hudood Ordinances, and compulsory zakat collection. Under his leadership, the state's ideological posture became visibly Islamic. However, the lack of consensus on what constituted Islamic law and the instrumental use of religion for political survival again deepened internal divisions. As Anatol Lieven observes, recurrent attempts by different administrations to radically change Pakistan, coupled with waves of Islamist mobilization against Western influences, have created an unstable ideological landscape.
Each successive government tried to imprint its own vision on the ideological direction of the state, resulting in an oscillating identity crisis. While General Musharraf sought to introduce the concept of "enlightened moderation," echoing modernist themes, his efforts too were met with skepticism by traditionalists and failed to create lasting ideological stability. More recently, democratic governments have tended to avoid addressing the identity issue altogether, preferring to focus on economic and foreign policy concerns.
The judiciary has occasionally played a role in this arena, especially in cases dealing with blasphemy, apostasy, and the application of Islamic provisions in the Constitution. The judiciary's interpretation often leaned toward conservative readings, which reflected not a coherent state ideology but the dominance of religious influence at specific moments. The lack of a single, agreed-upon vision has prevented the establishment of a stable, inclusive governance model.
This ambiguity also affects Pakistan's foreign policy. For example, its ties with the West, especially the United States, often generate domestic backlash from religious groups that perceive the state as abandoning Islamic causes. Conversely, attempts to align too closely with Islamic states often run into strategic limitations. Thus, Pakistan appears caught between two ideological worlds, unable to fully commit to either.
Educational policy is another area where the identity crisis is stark. While the state promotes Islamic values in textbooks and public discourse, it simultaneously pushes for science, technology, and modern education to compete globally. This dualism creates confusion in younger generations about the purpose and values of their education. It affects critical thinking and hinders the development of an intellectually cohesive citizenry.
Culturally, this ideological ambiguity breeds polarization. Media narratives swing between liberal advocacy and religious orthodoxy. Civil society remains fragmented between secular and religious visions, each accusing the other of betrayal. This ideological schizophrenia has limited the state's capacity to form national consensus on key issues such as women's rights, minority protections, and legal reforms.
The Constitution of Pakistan, although amended multiple times, still retains the Objective Resolution as its preamble. The Islamic provisions inserted over decades coexist uneasily with democratic clauses, leaving judges, lawmakers, and citizens grappling with contradictory mandates. No comprehensive effort has been made to clarify the role of Islam in a manner that accommodates diversity while promoting national unity.
The result of this enduring confusion is visible in the state's vulnerability to both extremism and external manipulation. Without a clear ideological framework, Pakistan remains susceptible to ideological exploitation by internal actors and foreign powers. National identity becomes a tool for political expediency rather than a unifying principle.
A nation cannot function on borrowed slogans and transient compromises. A clear identity, whether rooted in religion, democracy, or a blend of both, must be articulated through law, education, and public discourse. Pakistan’s survival as a stable and coherent state hinges on resolving this foundational ambiguity. It requires an honest, inclusive debate that recognizes the country’s pluralistic reality while acknowledging its historical roots.

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Pakistan must define what it means to be an Islamic republic in the modern world. This does not necessitate a theocracy but rather a principled framework that harmonizes Islamic ethics with democratic governance. The ideological middle ground must not be a foggy compromise but a clear and transparent system that reflects the aspirations of all citizens.
In conclusion, Pakistan’s ideological crisis is not a mere academic question. It is a matter that affects governance, development, foreign policy, and social cohesion. Until the nation makes peace with its own identity, its political and institutional structures will remain brittle, vulnerable to manipulation, and unable to fulfill the promise envisioned at its birth.