Pakistan’s energy woes have long been woven into the fabric of national discontent, marked by daily blackouts, industrial slowdowns, and a creeping paralysis in public service delivery. The Energy Policy 2013–2018 was introduced amid this chaos, with promises of reform, relief, and restructuring. It arrived with a sense of urgency, propelled by public frustration and the economic demands of an electricity-starved nation. Framed by the Council of Common Interests (CCI), the policy promised to do what previous efforts could not: close the demand-supply gap, restructure governance, and build a sustainable foundation for future energy needs. But while its ambition cannot be dismissed, its execution invites deeper examination.
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The policy was constructed around several pillars, philosophical clarity, operational redesign, governance tightening, and fiscal discipline. It emphasized not only expanding capacity but doing so efficiently and sustainably. The government envisioned increasing generation capacity to 26,000 megawatts while reducing per-unit cost from a burdensome Rs 14 to a more manageable Rs 10. Load shedding, officials claimed, would be eliminated by 2017, and 2018 would usher in an era of surplus. These claims, though bold, were rooted in an evolving infrastructure agenda. Power plant privatization, smart metering, and financial accountability all featured prominently in the plan’s architecture.
However, beneath the paper promises lay structural limitations. One of the more controversial clauses involved the phased delivery of subsidies. Instead of subsidizing the sector proactively, subsidies were to be granted only after production output had been delivered. While this aimed to prevent misuse and inject fiscal discipline, the consequence was a strain on already cash-starved projects. Moreover, for a population crushed by inflation and struggling with utility bills, this delayed relief only compounded hardship. It was a fiscal strategy with sound theory but harsh implications for the average consumer.
The attempt to decentralize electricity management by involving provincial governments more directly was a commendable move. In theory, this allowed for region-specific solutions, with transmission corridors planned on a provincial basis and regional heads held accountable for performance. Yet, in practice, inter-governmental coordination remained weak. Political differences and jurisdictional ambiguity diluted the effectiveness of this reform, as provinces struggled to align their frameworks with federal directives.
Privatization, another major plank of the policy, was viewed by some as the only viable path forward. The plan to privatize 25 state-run entities, including key power plants, was designed to improve operational efficiency and reduce losses. Nevertheless, critics feared that such sweeping privatization could compromise affordability and reliability, especially in remote or low-income regions. Public perception remained skeptical, particularly in the absence of clear guarantees for service quality and price regulation post-privatization.
On the technological front, the policy did seek modern solutions. Plans were made to upgrade SCADA systems for transmission monitoring and to install smart meters at feeder levels. Online fuel allocation mechanisms were also introduced to ensure transparency and reduce pilferage. Yet, without consistent maintenance budgets and trained personnel, these innovations risked falling into disrepair or misuse. Sophisticated systems cannot thrive in an environment still grappling with basic enforcement failures.
Furthermore, the policy’s commitment to diversify energy sources was notable. There was clear intent to shift away from an overreliance on thermal power, still responsible for roughly 44 percent of generation at the time, toward renewable, hydel, and nuclear options. Hydropower investments were planned, and coal was brought into the fold through the Thar development initiative. LNG terminals were to be built with Chinese collaboration, and the conversion of RFO plants to coal was pitched as a cost-saving maneuver. These moves were ambitious, but heavily reliant on foreign partnerships, technical imports, and the ability to navigate international diplomatic waters.
The ambition to introduce financial sustainability across the sector also received attention. Defaulters were to face strict penalties, including disconnections, and public entities were expected to repay outstanding obligations to regulatory bodies like OGRA. Nonetheless, the environment for accountability remained uneven. Political interference, corruption in appointments, and delayed financial reconciliations continued to plague the system, undermining efforts at fiscal discipline.
What the policy lacked was resilience against ground realities. For instance, the forecast of surplus energy by 2018 did not materialize with the certainty promised. Projects were delayed, some never broke ground, and demand projections underestimated urban expansion and industrial growth. The anticipated benefits of privatization were marred by regulatory confusion and implementation bottlenecks. Despite efforts to introduce pre-paid meters and online allocation systems, theft and line losses continued in distribution companies across the board.
In contrast to the promise of transparency and accountability, several power sector appointments during the period drew allegations of favoritism. Political stability, critical to attracting foreign investment, remained elusive, particularly after 2017. The resulting economic uncertainty deterred investors, especially in longer-term, capital-intensive energy infrastructure projects. Domestic investment, too, remained conservative, with stakeholders wary of unpredictable tariffs and regulatory shifts.
Another blind spot was the policy’s assumption that imported coal and LNG would offer a stable supply line. While these resources are crucial, relying too heavily on them exposed the country to exchange rate volatility and supply disruptions. The rising current account deficit by 2018, partially fueled by energy imports, bore testament to this risk. Moreover, global fuel prices fluctuated unfavorably during this period, increasing the financial burden on the power sector and ultimately the consumer.
Nonetheless, it would be unfair to dismiss the policy’s vision altogether. It marked one of the few attempts in recent decades to present a comprehensive framework rather than piecemeal fixes. Its multi-pronged approach, targeting governance, technology, production, and accountability, represented a shift from the reactive energy measures of the past. Several of its initiatives, particularly in expanding LNG access and initiating coal-based projects, laid the groundwork for subsequent reforms. Where it faltered was in matching its vision with institutional capability.
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Furthermore, international cooperation was neither ignored nor sidelined. The policy floated plans to import electricity from Iran, India, and Central Asia, aiming to tap into regional grids for added resilience. While these agreements faced delays due to regional geopolitics, especially the complexities around TAPI and broader Afghan instability, the intent underscored a pragmatic awareness of regional interdependence.
In closing, the Energy Policy 2013–2018 deserves recognition for its structure and scope. It acknowledged the multifaceted nature of the crisis and attempted to move beyond emergency patches. Yet, its success was limited by deep-rooted governance challenges, overestimation of timelines, and inconsistent execution. Transparency, accountability, and political stability, its so-called philosophical inputs, remained more rhetorical than real. Unless future energy strategies internalize these lessons and build institutional safeguards against inertia and interference, policies will continue to underdeliver. Pakistan’s energy future, like its present, will depend not just on policy documents, but on the political and administrative will to see them through.
