The New START Treaty of 2021, marking the extension of the original 2011 agreement, stands as the last remnant of a legacy that aimed to curtail the Cold War–era nuclear arms race. Framed between the United States and Russia, the treaty functions as a stabilizing mechanism in the sphere of strategic nuclear deterrence, limiting both nations to 1,550 deployed warheads and 700 deployed delivery systems. With tensions between nuclear-armed powers still simmering globally, its role becomes all the more vital. While the treaty confines itself to strategic arms reductions and bilateral trust-building through inspections and data sharing, its broader ripple effect extends to the international security architecture. It not only alters how deterrence is understood between the US and Russia but also sets a potential precedent for arms control dialogues beyond bilateralism. However, the landscape of nuclear deterrence is evolving rapidly, with modernization programs, geopolitical realignments, and strategic alliances demanding a shift in focus from arms quantity to technological superiority.
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The strategic deterrence posture between the United States and Russia has transitioned from a numbers game to a high-tech theatre. Hypersonic weapons, cyber capabilities, and artificial intelligence–driven systems are redefining what deterrence entails. While the New START treaty keeps traditional strategic forces in check, it leaves room for unchecked advancement in other areas. The US and Russia, while technically limiting their warhead counts, are still investing billions into upgrading delivery systems and warhead precision. In 2019 alone, global nuclear powers spent $73 billion on modernization, an increase of 10% from the previous year. The treaty, though effective in capping arsenals, is unable to stem the tide of qualitative improvements. Thus, modern deterrence now hinges not just on warhead quantity, but also on the speed, survivability, and technological sophistication of a state’s arsenal.
Moreover, the New START Treaty hints at a strategic pivot from bilateralism to multilateral engagement. The US has expressed concerns about China’s growing, opaque nuclear arsenal, while Russia has called for NATO’s involvement in any future arms control discussions. Although China currently holds far fewer nuclear weapons than the US or Russia, its expansionist strategy and absence from any major arms treaty raise alarms in Washington. Conversely, Russia’s anxiety is tied more to NATO’s strategic posturing than China’s trajectory. Within this triangle, the treaty can serve as a launching pad for multilateral negotiations that aim to bring emerging powers into a structured arms control regime. This shift could redefine global nuclear order, where deterrence is not just a bilateral concern but a collective responsibility.
For Pakistan, the implications of the New START Treaty are indirect but noteworthy. As a de facto nuclear power and a non-signatory of global arms control treaties like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Pakistan is not bound by the START framework. However, the treaty subtly shifts global attention toward responsible nuclear behavior and transparency. While Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is built on minimum credible deterrence aimed at countering India’s growing military might, the international appetite for nuclear restraint could pressure Islamabad diplomatically in future multilateral discussions. Moreover, as the US and Russia look to rope in other nuclear states, Islamabad may face expectations to adopt more formal declarations or limits on its arsenal—especially given its comparatively small stockpile.
Pakistan’s nuclear policy, shaped by its unique security calculus and regional threats, is unlikely to be altered by the New START Treaty alone. With India’s own arsenal expanding and its military modernization ongoing, Islamabad has little room to consider limitations that might reduce its strategic parity. Additionally, its non-participation in any bilateral nuclear arms reduction mechanism means that, legally and structurally, the New START has no binding impact. However, if multilateral frameworks emerge from the treaty’s momentum, Pakistan might eventually find itself at a crossroads where diplomatic costs of remaining outside could rise.
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Despite these pressures, Pakistan retains a distinct advantage—its relatively small and transparent nuclear program. Compared to the vast arsenals of the US and Russia, Pakistan’s capability is modest and maintained within the doctrine of deterrence, not escalation. This “dwarf-scale” status shields it from much of the scrutiny that follows larger nuclear states. As long as Islamabad remains within the bounds of responsible behavior and refrains from aggressive posturing or technology proliferation, it is unlikely to be drawn into treaties like START without broader multilateral reform.
In sum, the New START Treaty serves as a critical, albeit partial, tool in maintaining global nuclear balance. It curbs the vertical expansion of strategic weapons between two major powers and hints at a future where more states might be brought into similar frameworks. For the US and Russia, it provides predictability and mutual assurance, even as both continue to pursue technological superiority. For Pakistan, the treaty is a reminder of the evolving nature of global nuclear norms—ones that may one day extend to include all de facto nuclear states. But until such frameworks arise, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, shaped by regional imperatives and strategic necessity, remains largely untouched by the ripple effects of bilateral treaties like New START.
