The constitutional journey of Pakistan, rather than beginning on a firm democratic footing, was riddled with crisis and missteps that weakened the very institutions intended to safeguard the rule of law. Far from being a mere historical episode, the dissolution of the first Constitutional Assembly in 1954 remains a pivotal moment that exposed the underlying fault lines between civilian authority and the military-bureaucratic establishment. What could have been the foundation for a strong democratic state was instead manipulated by those in power to retain control, thereby sidelining constitutional evolution and public representation.
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After the partition of British India, Pakistan inherited the structure and legal scaffolding of the Government of India Act 1935, temporarily adopted as the country’s de facto constitution. The formation of the first Constitutional Assembly under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah on 11 August 1947 was a landmark in Pakistan’s nation-building efforts. Yet, this promising beginning was quickly undermined by internal political rivalries and executive overreach. Following Jinnah’s demise, Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan assumed the role of president of the Assembly. His efforts, however, to regulate the arbitrary powers wielded by the office of the governor-general faced resistance.
Sir Malik Ghulam Muhammad, the third governor-general of Pakistan, exploited constitutional ambiguities for personal and institutional advantage. On 17 April 1953, he dismissed the then-prime minister, Khuwaja Nazimuddin, and installed Muhammad Ali Bogra in his place, invoking powers under Section 10(2) of the Government of India Act 1935. This move, presented under the guise of addressing economic failure and political instability, was, in reality, a blatant exercise of executive dominance over representative governance.
In response, the Constitutional Assembly acted to check the growing concentration of power. It passed two critical bills aimed at curbing the influence of the governor-general. One bill introduced Section 223-A, empowering courts with writ jurisdiction, and the other sought to repeal Section 10(2), the very clause used to justify the dismissal of the prime minister. However, these legislative efforts were deliberately obstructed by the governor-general’s absence, as his assent was constitutionally required. Upon his return, instead of addressing the concerns raised, he chose to dissolve the Assembly on 24 October 1954.
This act of dissolution marked a breakdown of constitutional order. Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan took legal recourse and challenged the action in the Sindh Chief Court. The court ruled in his favor and issued a writ of quo-warranto against the ministers of the Bogra cabinet, thereby inhibiting them from continuing in office. It also restored Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan to the presidency of the Assembly and restrained interference in his duties, asserting the legal standing of the Assembly. This judgment momentarily offered hope for the supremacy of constitutionalism.
However, the matter escalated when the federal government appealed to the Federal Court. The court, rather than addressing the central issue of whether the Assembly had been legally dissolved, focused on a technicality. It ruled that since the bills passed by the Assembly lacked the assent of the governor-general, they were invalid, and consequently, the Sindh Court lacked the jurisdiction to issue writs. In a majority decision of four to one, the Federal Court upheld the government’s appeal, asserting that under the Indian Independence Act of 1947, the governor-general remained an integral part of the legislature and his assent was essential for legislation to become law.
This ruling not only nullified the legislative safeguards introduced by the Assembly but also legitimized the executive's unilateral actions, setting a dangerous precedent. The judgment did not examine whether the dissolution of the Assembly was justifiable under constitutional norms. Instead, it interpreted constitutional law in a manner that reinforced the dominance of unelected authorities.
The long-term consequences of this decision were profound. By validating the governor-general’s action through the so-called doctrine of necessity, the court effectively weakened the foundational principle of constitutional supremacy. The ruling paved the way for future military and bureaucratic interventions in the political process, eroding the democratic aspirations of the country. It institutionalized the concept that extra-constitutional actions could be validated post-facto under perceived national exigencies.
Pakistan's constitutional development suffered immensely. A full constitution was not adopted until 1956, nearly a decade after independence. During this period, the absence of a working constitutional framework left democratic institutions vulnerable to manipulation and encroachment. Successive regimes, particularly military ones, would later invoke the doctrine of necessity to justify coups and authoritarian rule. The verdict also undermined public confidence in the judiciary, which was increasingly viewed not as an impartial guardian of the constitution but as a facilitator of power politics.
Hamid Khan, in his authoritative account of Pakistan’s constitutional evolution, observed that the decision by the Federal Court irreparably damaged the credibility of the judiciary in the eyes of the public. Rather than being a bulwark against tyranny, the judiciary became complicit in its advance. The effects of this ruling can still be felt today, where institutional imbalances continue to haunt Pakistan’s political architecture.
The actions of Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad, and the subsequent judgment by the Federal Court, entrenched a culture of executive dominance. The dismissal of the prime minister without parliamentary consultation, the rejection of constitutionally passed legislation, and the dissolution of the Assembly were all orchestrated not in national interest but to consolidate power. This subversion of constitutional mechanisms not only delayed the country’s legal development but also obstructed the formation of a democratic ethos.
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Even as constitutional frameworks were eventually established, the spirit of democratic governance remained elusive. The precedent established in 1954 was repeatedly cited to justify unconstitutional takeovers, from Ayub Khan to Zia-ul-Haq and beyond. Civilian institutions, never allowed to mature under uninterrupted constitutional rule, remained subordinate to unelected centers of power.
To summarize, Pakistan’s early constitutional crisis was not an isolated episode but the genesis of a broader pattern that would dominate its political history. The dissolution of the first Constitutional Assembly and the Federal Court’s endorsement of executive overreach set into motion a series of events that deeply affected the balance of power in the country. It weakened public trust in democratic institutions, stalled legal development, and provided the blueprint for future authoritarianism. At a critical juncture when Pakistan could have established a robust and democratic constitutional tradition, opportunism and institutional complicity won out over principle and legality. That loss continues to reverberate in the present, as the nation still seeks to reconcile its democratic aspirations with the legacy of its constitutional betrayals.
