The shifting geopolitical dynamics of South Asia are redrawing regional alliances, with the Pakistan–China–Bangladesh bloc emerging as a powerful alternative to the long-dormant South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Born from structural failures in regional integration and catalysed by Bangladesh’s political transition in 2024, this trilateral partnership signals a move towards pragmatism, strategic connectivity, and a rebalancing of power. With China offering economic incentives through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Pakistan advocating for a geo-economic vision, and Bangladesh pursuing a post-Hasina foreign policy reset, this alliance not only counters Indian dominance but may also redefine how South Asian countries engage with each other and the wider world.
SAARC was founded in 1985 with high hopes for regional unity among its eight members: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. However, the organisation has remained largely symbolic, marred by the deep-seated rivalry between India and Pakistan. The last successful SAARC summit was held in 2014, and since the cancellation of the 2016 summit following the Uri attack, no meaningful revival has taken place. India has since shifted focus towards sub-regional platforms like BIMSTEC, further marginalising SAARC. In this vacuum, China has expanded its economic footprint through the BRI, particularly via the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), while Bangladesh, under new leadership, has embraced alternatives to India-centric diplomacy.
SAARC’s Institutional Paralysis
One of the central drivers behind the formation of the Pakistan–China–Bangladesh bloc is the institutional failure of SAARC itself. Designed without a dispute resolution mechanism, SAARC has consistently fallen victim to political deadlock, especially between India and Pakistan. Member states have grown increasingly frustrated with the absence of concrete outcomes and the tendency of regional summits to collapse under bilateral tensions. This deadlock has rendered the organisation ineffective in responding to regional challenges such as climate change, trade liberalisation, or security cooperation. As SAARC remains stagnant, it creates space for newer, more functional alignments rooted in mutual interest rather than geopolitical symbolism.
China’s Strategic Pull through the Belt and Road Initiative
China’s Belt and Road Initiative has emerged as a transformative force in the region, offering infrastructure, energy, and trade connectivity with fewer bureaucratic hurdles than multilateral institutions like SAARC. Pakistan has been a key partner in this regard, hosting CPEC, a multi-billion-dollar flagship corridor linking Gwadar Port to China’s western regions. Similarly, Bangladesh has become a major recipient of Chinese investments, including the Padma Bridge Rail Link and Payra Power Plant. The Kunming trilateral talks in mid-2025 reinforced the idea of integrating Bangladesh more directly into the CPEC framework, thus forming a seamless corridor from Central Asia to the Bay of Bengal. China’s ability to deliver results quickly and its willingness to finance large-scale infrastructure projects make it an attractive partner for both Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Bangladesh’s Political Reset under Muhammad Yunus
The ousting of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024 after a massive student-led uprising was a watershed moment in South Asian politics. Under the leadership of Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, the interim Bangladeshi government has undertaken sweeping political reforms, while also reorienting the country’s foreign policy. Where Hasina maintained close ties with India, the new government has moved decisively in a different direction, demanding Hasina’s extradition from India, dismantling pro-Indian institutional influence, and strengthening relations with China and Pakistan. By early 2025, Pakistan and Bangladesh had normalised diplomatic ties, resumed trade, reintroduced direct flights, and initiated defence dialogues. This shift demonstrates not only a reconfiguration of bilateral relations but also a clear departure from the Indian orbit.
Pakistan’s Geo-Economic Recalibration
Pakistan’s regional policy has evolved in recent years from a security-centric approach to a geo-economic framework. Facing diplomatic isolation and economic distress, Islamabad has sought to reposition itself as a transit hub between South, Central, and West Asia. The idea is to leverage geography rather than ideology, and the partnership with China and a re-engaged Bangladesh serves this purpose. Islamabad views Dhaka’s new foreign policy as an opportunity to build an economic corridor connecting Gwadar to Chittagong. At the same time, Pakistan continues to deepen military cooperation with Bangladesh, including potential defence equipment deals and joint training programmes. This recalibration allows Pakistan to reduce dependence on SAARC and counterbalance India’s growing influence in other regional platforms.
A Bloc Rooted in Pragmatism, Not Ideology
Unlike SAARC, which was born out of a post-colonial idealism but hampered by real politic, the emerging Pakistan–China–Bangladesh bloc is grounded in pragmatism. It prioritises results over rhetoric, bilateralism over consensus paralysis, and connectivity over confrontation. The Kunming summit in June 2025 discussed the creation of a “South Asia Growth Corridor” that would be open to other like-minded countries such as Sri Lanka, Maldives, and even Iran. The focus areas include trade facilitation, digital infrastructure, energy cooperation, and regional transport networks. This informality makes the bloc more agile, less bureaucratic, and better positioned to respond to evolving regional challenges. It is not meant to be a direct replacement for SAARC, but rather a functional response to its institutional fatigue.
Countering Indian Regional Hegemony
A key but often unstated motivation behind the formation of this bloc is to push back against India’s dominance in South Asian affairs. Both Pakistan and China have strategic reasons to counterbalance Indian influence, and with the shift in Bangladesh’s foreign policy, they now have a willing partner in Dhaka. India’s refusal to engage meaningfully with SAARC, its assertive behaviour in bilateral disputes, and its perceived neglect of smaller neighbours have alienated many in the region. Bangladesh, once India’s most reliable ally in SAARC, is now openly critical of New Delhi, especially over water-sharing issues and cross-border violence. By aligning with China and Pakistan, Bangladesh gains leverage and diversification in its diplomatic toolkit, while the bloc collectively signals a new power axis in South Asia.
Strategic and Economic Benefits for Bangladesh
For Bangladesh, joining this bloc presents a range of strategic and economic benefits. Geopolitically, it helps Dhaka assert independence from India’s shadow, allowing it to reposition itself as a bridge between South and Southeast Asia. Economically, integration with Chinese and Pakistani markets offers new trade routes, investment opportunities, and access to defence technology. CPEC’s eastern expansion could connect Bangladesh directly to Central Asian energy resources via Pakistan and China. Additionally, digital cooperation under China’s Digital Silk Road initiative promises to modernise Bangladesh’s ICT infrastructure. All these developments bolster Bangladesh’s image as an emerging middle power with regional ambitions beyond its traditional alliances.
Inclusion of Other Disillusioned SAARC Members
The bloc’s potential extends beyond its three core members. Several other SAARC nations, particularly Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Afghanistan, have expressed frustration with SAARC’s ineffectiveness and India’s centralised role. These countries have growing ties with China and may see the Pakistan–China–Bangladesh alignment as a more functional regional option. China’s diplomatic outreach in the Maldives and Sri Lanka, coupled with development financing, suggests an appetite for a broader coalition. If these nations join or coordinate informally with the new bloc, the architecture of South Asian regionalism may shift irreversibly. In this context, the bloc is not merely a trilateral arrangement but a potential nucleus for a larger, more inclusive regional order.
While the Pakistan–China–Bangladesh bloc presents a promising alternative to SAARC, it also carries certain risks. The exclusion of India may exacerbate regional divisions rather than healing them. Heavy dependence on China raises concerns about sovereignty and economic vulnerability, especially for Bangladesh. Moreover, the informal nature of the bloc could hinder long-term institutionalisation and accountability. There is also the risk that this emerging alliance replicates the very flaws that crippled SAARC, if power asymmetries and unilateralism go unchecked. The bloc’s success will depend on whether it can maintain balance among its members, deliver tangible benefits, and avoid becoming a platform for great-power rivalry.
The emergence of the Pakistan–China–Bangladesh bloc marks a significant shift in South Asia’s geopolitical landscape. As SAARC fades into irrelevance, this new alignment offers a more practical and flexible model of regional cooperation, one that prioritises economic connectivity, diplomatic realism, and strategic recalibration. Rooted in shared interests rather than historical grievances, the bloc presents an opportunity to escape the gridlock that has long characterised South Asian regionalism. If it continues to expand and institutionalise, this trilateral partnership could redefine the contours of regional engagement and offer a viable alternative to India-centric models of cooperation. In a region long held back by division, it may well be the beginning of a more functional future.
